PalmSource to Present Wireless Everywhere Vision

If you think this stuff is heading in any other direction you are wrong.

The infrastructure is being laid now.

Before we "go everywhere" some of us would like to build a prototype.

Some bone heads with box cutters have kind of made "going everywhere" silly. We can bring back the fun in "go everywhere" without compromising the "go everywhere" freedom generations of our youth have sacrificed so much.

"Back to the future" great movie Mike ... does not include taking away choices. Raven wants to offer more for people to do with their wallets without compromising their freedom to choose.

"Gota love it" and "i'm loving it" too just would be nice to get it delivered to the house how we want. Eh some folks want to sell beef burgers, French fries and salads, some want a home with a family, dog, and boat and to build, sell and interact with people driven innovation. And some want the choice to purchase what they need and want how they want ... win-win.

Vision is good when looking together RF did we can too.

Peace,

E-T

e-tellurian

completing the e-com circle with a people driven we-com solution

*Zing*

Peace Out
Alan

Enough of the spin and buzzword press releases.

Where's the beef?

quoting:

c't: what would you advice Microsoft with respect to smartphones?

Nagel: I would rather not give advice to Microsoft...

c't: ... and if you wouldn't be CEO of PalmSource?

Nagel: Then I would say: "just start all over right from the scratch" [from the beginning].

===========

Well, duh! One of MS's own drones at the time said the same damned thing. But do the PPC cultboyz even *know* that? (Expect *them* to read books -- and even books about the idol they worship?)

quoting:

Many executives inside Microsoft thought Ballmer's reorganization didn't go far enough in untangling the company's many charters. Harel Kodesh, an Israeli-born engineer in charge of Microsoft's efforts on non-PC devices, had undergone an almost religious epiphany. Kodesh had helped develop Windows CE for "consumer electronics" such as handhelds, cell phones, set-top boxes, and the voice-activated "Auto PC" for car dashboards. At first, Kodesh subscribed to Gates's notion that, as with PCs, a uniform operating system across many different electronic devices would attract software developers, who generally target their efforts on the highest-volume platform. Because Windows CE used the same tools and Win32 interfaces as Windows for the PC, Microsoft's dominance in the PC market would give it additional leverage in the non-PC world. Windows CE was a key element in the Windows Everywhere strategy.

But it hadn't worked out that way. Microsoft seemed permanently behind in the handheld market, where Palm was established as the software of choice for "personal digital assistants." And Microsoft was being outflanked by a consortium of cell phone makers, led by Nokia, which established the Symbian joint venture with a British software maker, Psion, to create a specialized operating system far Web-connected cell phones, a potentially huge market.

Kodesh realized that he, and Microsoft, were both on the wrong track. The vaunted Windows leverage had turned out to be a liability. Kodesh had met *Innovator's Dilemma* author Clayton Christensen at a symposium at Harvard. He came back to Redmond with a hundred copies of the book for his thousand-person group. The "information appliance" was exactly the kind of disruptive technology Christensen warned about, Kodesh argued. The new devices needed to be small, cheap, and most of all "cool." That meant they should be precisely tailored to the needs of particular consumers for particular uses. Microsoft's software was like a Swiss Army knife, adequate for many things but optimized for none. It was the only software that could work in handhelds, phones, and set-tops, but it wasn't the best software for any of those categories.

To Kodesh, Microsoft's initiatives were driven by the dictates of the company's technology, rather than the wishes of consumers. An electronics maker like Casio could focus on delivering a product with just the right features for consumers; Microsoft insisted on squeezing PC applications like Word and Excel into the miniature devices.

Kodesh had a radical idea. Microsoft should keep Windows CE for handheld devices but start from scratch on new software for cell phones and all other non-PC devices. Microsoft should start from the other direction, asking manufacturers what they could build for, say, ninety-nine dollars and offering to give them the software they needed, rather than only the software the company already had. The choice was familiar: Would Microsoft embrace the new market for non-PC devices, create an autonomous company-within-a-company to tackle it, and do anything it took to win? Or would it shackle the new devices to its traditional businesses?

In September 1999, Kodesh wrote a memo to Gates and Ballmer under the heading "Starting from Scratch." We need to kill Windows CE for those categories, he argued. Win32 is not an advantage; it's a tax on device design. It served to further Microsoft's strategy but not to help consumers. Given all their other alternatives, electronics manufacturers wouldn't pay the tax. Kodesh wanted to take a small group of developers and work solely on developing the best software for information appliances, unconstrained by the needs of the rest of the company.

Gates rejected the suggestions. "It's very disappointing you feel that way," he told Kodesh. "We don't have time to start from scratch."

Kodesh left Microsoft several months later. [Breaking Windows: How Bill Gates Fumbled the Future of Microsoft - David Bank; Copyright © 2001 by David Bank; pgs. 179-180]

We-com does not mean one currency it means wireless electronic commerce. Commerce traded digitally can move in many ways and take on visions of the artisan in images as we do today with analog currency.

The purpose in building a prototype is to determine what people want.

E-T

e-tellurian

completing the e-com circle with a people driven we-com solution